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POLLAK, District Judge. 
          In this long-running litigation   aspects of which have 
been before this court before   appellants, a class consisting 
of all past, present, and future inmates of the Allegheny County 
Jail, appeal from an order entered by the district court on May 
26, 1995, which, after argument but without an evidentiary 
hearing, approved a modification of a portion of a consent decree 
entered in July 1989.  Under the terms of the 1989 consent 
decree, appellees   Allegheny County, officials of Allegheny 
County, and officials of the Allegheny County Jail, all of whom 
we will refer to collectively as "the County"   were required to 
establish a facility to provide services to mentally ill inmates.  
The May 26, 1995 order vacated this directive, replacing it with 
a requirement that the County provide services to mentally ill 
inmates through community-based mental health programs.  Under 
the terms of the May 26, 1995 order, only inmates who meet 
certain eligibility criteria could participate in the community- 
based programs.  An inmate with a "past history of violence" or 
who faces charges more serious than a "minor, non-violent crime" 
would be ineligible for admission to any of these community-based 
mental health programs.  Appellants assert that this limitation 
violates the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 and the Americans with 
Disabilities Act of 1990.  We find that resolving this question 
requires ascertaining certain facts, and we therefore vacate the 
May 26, 1995 order and remand for factfinding.   
 
                                I. 
          The Allegheny County Jail holds both convicted 
criminals and pretrial detainees.  In 1976, inmates of the jail 
filed this class action litigation, asserting, under 42 U.S.C. § 
1983, that the conditions of confinement did not satisfy minimum 
constitutional requirements.  In two opinions issued in 1978, the 
district court found that conditions at the jail were shockingly 
substandard in a wide variety of ways.  Owens-El v. Robinson, 442 
F. Supp. 1368 (W.D. Pa. 1978); Owens-El v. Robinson, 457 F. Supp. 
984 (W.D. Pa. 1978).  As this court later summarized certain of 
the district court's general findings: 
          Living facilities were unhealthy and unsafe.  
          The plumbing system was antiquated and in 
          disrepair.  As a result, leaks and overflows 
          frequently occurred in the cells.  The cells 
          lacked adequate lighting; the efforts of 
          inmate-electricians seeking to remedy that 
          defect caused exposed electrical wires which 
          presented fire and shock hazards.  Prisoners 
          were required to sleep on canvas cots, many 
          of which were discolored by blood, vomit, 
          feces, and urine.  Vermin abounded.  Cell 
          temperatures fluctuated between extreme cold 
          in the winter and extreme heat in the summer.  
          The shortage of guards reduced supervision of 
          the inmates and permitted hoarding and 
          vandalism of necessary supplies.  This in 
          turn contributed significantly to chronic 
          shortages of necessary items such as blankets 
          and bath towels. 
 
          . . .  
 
               Some inmates were placed in solitary 
          confinement for up to fourteen days without a 
          mattress, toilet articles, or a change of 
          clothing.  Other inmates were confined in the 
          nude in the isolation cell, an unfurnished, 
          darkened, windowless room for up to fourteen 
          consecutive hours, without any blanket or 
          sheets. 
 
Inmates of the Allegheny County Jail v. Pierce, 612 F.2d 754, 757 
(3d Cir. 1979).    
          The district court addressed in some detail the 
treatment accorded inmates who displayed mental disorders.  The 
court noted that no psychiatrists or psychologists served on the 
jail staff.  Further, the court described the "restraint room" in 
which were housed inmates who acted out, or who suffered from 
withdrawal, delirium tremens, epileptic seizures, or other mental 
conditions: 
               In this bleak room the inmates are 
          placed in a hospital gown or naked on a 
          canvas cot with a hole cut in the middle.  
          Their body wastes drop through the hole into 
          a tub on the floor underneath the cot.  The 
          tub is emptied twice a day.  These inmates 
          are shackled by leather restraints to the 
          canvas cots.  Physical restraints may be 
          either full, where the inmate's wrists and 
          ankles are bound by the manacles to the cot, 
          or partial, where only one or both ankles are 
          manacled.  The medical logs, introduced into 
          evidence, revealed that inmates have been 
          held in such restraints for as long as 
          twenty-nine days. 
 
Owens-El, 442 F. Supp. at 1380.  The court decided, however, that 
addressing the treatment of mentally ill inmates would "go[] 
beyond the parameters of the case."  Id. at 1382. 
          We reversed this latter ruling and concluded that the 
district court had authority to address the mental health 
conditions at the jail.  Inmates of the Allegheny County Jail v. 
Peirce, 612 F.2d 754, 763 (3d Cir. 1979).  On remand, the 
district court held that the lack of services for mentally ill 
inmates violated the Constitution.  The court found that "a 
significant proportion, perhaps as many as a quarter to a third," 
of the inmates at the jail could be considered seriously mentally 
ill.  Inmates of the Allegheny County Jail v. Peirce, 487 F. 
Supp. 638, 641 (W.D. Pa. 1980).  And the court further found 
that, notwithstanding the high proportion of mentally ill 
inmates, there was  
          no system for care of mentally ill inmates in 
          the jail and . . . the haphazard and 
          inconsistent care and protection now being 
          afforded is far below minimum standards.  The 
          deficiencies in immediate care result in 
          physical danger to the ill inmates and to 
          others, create security problems in the jail, 
          aggravate   rather than alleviate   the 
          conditions of many of the most seriously ill, 
          and contribute to the chaotic environment in 
          the jail. 
 
Id. at 643.  Accordingly, the court ordered the County (1) to 
create a separate mental health unit within the jail to house 
mentally ill inmates; (2) to establish a program for screening 
all incoming inmates for mental illness; (3) to hire an 
administrator to implement mental illness programs; and (4) to 
hire two psychiatrists and additional nurses.  The court further 
ordered that the mental health unit be staffed with at least one 
guard and one nurse per shift, and that civil commitment 
proceedings should commence within 72 hours of a determination 
that an inmate should be transferred to a mental health 
institution.  
          In 1988, the district court, in the face of dramatic 
overcrowding in the jail and continuing constitutional 
violations, ordered that the jail be closed.  Inmates of the 
Allegheny County Jail v. Wecht, 699 F. Supp. 1137 (W.D. Pa. 
1988).  The court concluded that the 102-year old facility 
"cannot handle the demands required of a modern jail facility."  
Id. at 1146.  Among the most grievous problems caused by 
overcrowding was the lack of space for adequate mental health 
care.  The forty beds in the new mental health unit were 
regularly filled, and, as a result, mentally ill inmates were 
often housed among the general inmate population, causing 
disruptions among both groups. 
          We affirmed the district court's order closing the 
jail.  Inmates of the Allegheny County Jail v. Wecht, 874 F.2d 
147, 155 (3d Cir. 1989).   
          On July 7, 1989, subsequent to the affirmance of the 
jail-closing order, the parties to this litigation entered into a 
consent decree to remedy the many constitutional violations that 
had been found.  Paragraph 7 of the consent decree addressed the 
provision of services for mentally ill inmates as follows: 
          The Defendants commit themselves to the 
          development of a treatment/work release 
          facility for the mentally ill comparable to 
          the presently planned drug treatment facility 
          as set forth in Defendant's Exhibit 3, 
          admitted at the June 12, 1989 court hearing.  
          A specific plan for this project and a 
          progress report on its implementation shall 
          be included in the monthly progress reports 
          required by the Court's Order of May 12, 
          1989. 
 
Consent Decree ¶ 7, entered July 7, 1989.  Under this provision, 
the County became obligated to establish a single, institutional 
facility for handling mentally ill inmates. 
          Three years later, the County sought a modification of 
the consent decree.  Rather than create a separate facility for 
mentally ill inmates, the County sought to implement a plan under 
which mentally ill inmates would receive treatment in community- 
based mental health programs.  Under the County's plan, case 
managers would link mentally ill inmates with services provided 
within the community.  Applying Rufo v. Inmates of Suffolk County 
Jail, 112 S. Ct. 748 (1992)   in which the Supreme Court 
established a standard for assessing proposed modifications of 
consent decrees   the district court granted the County's 
requested modification.  Inmates of the Allegheny County Jail v. 
Wecht, 797 F. Supp. 428, 434-35 (W.D. Pa. 1992).  Under Rufo, the 
party seeking modification must, among other things, "establish[] 
that a significant change in circumstances warrants revision of 
the decree."  112 S. Ct. at 760.  The district court concluded 
that mental health philosophy had shifted from an emphasis on 
institutionalized care to a belief in the efficacy of treatment 
in non-institutional settings, and that this change in philosophy 
constituted a change in circumstances sufficient to satisfy Rufo. 
          We reversed, concluding that the change in mental 
health philosophy predated the 1989 consent decree and therefore 
did not justify the modification.  Inmates of Allegheny County v. 
Wecht, No. 92-3434 (3d Cir. May 20, 1993).  We noted, however, 
that both the inmates and the County no longer viewed the terms 
of the 1989 consent decree as the optimal remedy and that both 
parties supported community-based treatment.  While the County 
viewed community-based services alone as the best approach, the 
inmates wanted such services to be supplemented by decentralized 
"structured residential" settings for those inmates who could not 
be accommodated through community-based programs.  We remanded in 
order to allow the district court to make factual findings as to 
whether some other change of circumstance   e.g., an increased 
availability of community-based programs subsequent to 1989    
might justify a modification of the consent decree. 
          In 1995, the County and the inmates undertook to 
negotiate a modification of the 1989 consent decree.  Under the 
proposed modification, Paragraph 7 of the 1989 consent decree, 
mandating the creation of a separate facility for the mentally 
ill, was to be eliminated.  In its place, the parties agreed to 
the creation of a Forensic Support Program, under which the 
County would provide community-based mental health services to a 
maximum of twenty-five inmates.  The agreement contemplated that 
the Forensic Support Program would utilize the services of local 
hospitals, psychiatric institutions, and human service and 
release groups, and that judicial approval would be required 
before an inmate would be released into the program.     
          The County and the inmates recognized that not all 
mentally ill inmates would be appropriate candidates for 
treatment in the community-based Forensic Support Program.  
Based on this recognition, the parties developed eligibility 
criteria covering several categories of mentally ill inmates:  
The agreed eligibility criteria are as follows: 
          [1]  Persons must not pose an apparent risk 
          of harm to themselves or others; 
          [2]  Persons must not be engaged in a 
          calculated conspiracy; 
          [3]  Persons must not be charged with any 
          sexual assault crimes, any crimes involving 
          the victimization of minors, and crimes 
          involving drug trafficking, including, but 
          not limited to, the delivery or possession 
          with the intent to deliver a controlled 
          substance, or conspiracy to commit any of 
          these crimes. 
          [4]  Persons must agree to comply with any 
          conditions of release, if any, imposed by the 
          holding authority, including participation in 
          prescribed treatment. 
 
Order of May 26, 1995 at ¶ 5.  But the parties were not able to 
reach agreement on whether inmates who had a history of violence, 
or who were charged with violent crimes, should be categorically 
excluded from community-based programs or whether individualized 
assessments of such persons could adequately screen out those who 
posed a public safety risk.  It is this disagreement that has 
precipitated this newest round of litigation.   
          In the district court, the County contended that an 
inmate "must be charged with a minor, non-violent crime and not 
have a past history of violence" in order to qualify for the 
community-based programs.  Public safety, as well as public 
support for community-based programs, the County argued, require 
the exclusion from these programs of all inmates who may have had 
a history of violence.  In contrast, the inmates contended that 
individual assessments of the threats posed by mentally ill 
inmates would adequately address the County's public safety 
concerns.  On May 26, 1995, the district court approved the 
County's proposed modification and, accordingly, directed that 
only an inmate "charged with a minor, non-violent crime" and who 
did not have a "past history of violence" could be included in 
the community-based programs.  The court's order contains no 
explication of the phrase "charged with a minor, non-violent 
crime" or the term "past history of violence."  Since the order 
was not accompanied by an opinion, or by findings of fact and 
conclusions of law, the precise scope of the quoted language is 
unclear.   
          After entry of the district court's order, the inmates 
moved for reconsideration or, alternatively, for findings of fact 
pursuant to Rule 52(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.  The 
motion was denied, and the inmates thereupon appealed from the 
district court's May 26, 1995 order modifying the consent 
decree. 
 
                               II. 
          We review a modification of a consent decree for abuse 
of discretion.  Delaware Valley Citizens' Council v. Commonwealth 
of Pennsylvania, 674 F.2d 976, 978 (3d Cir. 1982) ("Our scope of 
review on this appeal is narrow: whether, in its order modifying 
and refusing to modify the consent decree, the district court 
abused its discretion.").  See also Favia v. Indiana University 
of Pennsylvania, 7 F.3d 332, 340-42 (3d Cir. 1993).  Abuse of 
discretion can be found when a district court's decision is 
"arbitrary, capricious or irrational or employs improper 
standards, criteria or procedures," Favia, 7 F.3d at 340 (quoting 
Pennsylvania v. Local Union 542, 807 F.2d 330 (3d Cir. 1986)), 
such as when a district court does not "hold an evidentiary 
hearing before modifying a consent decree in such a manner as to 
remove requirements previously imposed."  Delaware Valley, 674 
F.2d at 981. 
          Appellants argue that under the Rehabilitation Act of 
1973 and the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA) the 
County cannot categorically exclude from community-based mental 
health services all inmates who are charged with minor, non- 
violent crimes or who have past histories of violence.  According 
to the appellants, violent behavior is often a manifestation of 
mental illness.  Thus, the appellants argue, categorical 
exclusion on the basis of such behavior, whether actual or 
alleged, constitutes disability-based discrimination.   
Acknowledging that persons who pose a threat to others are not 
"qualified" for community-based programs, the inmates assert that 
some mentally ill persons who have in the past committed acts of 
violence, or who are currently charged with violent crimes, do 
not pose a present threat to others, and that such persons are, 
indeed, "qualified" for community-based services.  Providing 
individualized assessments, the inmates contend, would reasonably 
accommodate the needs of this group of mentally ill persons 
without unduly burdening County resources.   
          In response, the County first argues that the 
Rehabilitation Act and the ADA do not apply to correctional 
facilities.  Second   assuming arguendo that these statutes do 
apply   the County maintains that differentiating among inmates 
on the basis of their violent behavior does not amount to 
disability-based discrimination.  And even if exclusion of 
violent inmates from community-based mental health services is, 
in some cases, exclusion on the basis of disability, the County 
asserts that inmates who are charged with violent crimes or who 
have been violent in the past are categorically unqualified for 
community-based programs because they pose an unacceptable safety 
threat and because providing community-based services to 
potentially violent inmates would jeopardize public support for 
these services.  The County further argues that individualized 
assessments could not reliably screen out those inmates with a 
violent past who pose a present safety threat.  Moreover, the 
County argues, even if individual assessments could reliably 
identify those inmates who currently pose a safety threat, such 
individualized assessments would be a heavy drain on County 
resources and thus would not constitute a reasonable 
accommodation.   
 
                                A. 
          The first question to be addressed is whether the 
Rehabilitation Act and the ADA apply to correctional facilities. 
          The Rehabilitation Act and the ADA have a common 
substantive core   prohibiting broad arrays of institutions that 
serve the public from discriminating against disabled individuals 
on the basis of disability.  Section 504 of the Rehabilitation 
Act applies not only to any program conducted by an executive 
agency of the federal government but to "any program or activity 
receiving Federal financial assistance," 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); the 
term "program or activity" is defined as "all of the operations 
of a department, agency, special purpose district, or other 
instrumentality of a State or of a local government."  29 U.S.C. 
§ 794(b)(1)(A).  Title II of the ADA applies to the "services, 
programs, or activities" of any "public entity," 42 U.S.C. § 
12132, without regard to whether such services, programs, or 
activities are federally funded; a "public entity" includes "any 
State or local government [and] any department, agency, special 
purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State or States 
or local government."  42 U.S.C. § 12131(1).  Thus, as a matter 
of syntax, the two statutes cover all aspects of state and local 
governance.  Accordingly, if it be the case that when Congress 
writes a statute in plain words those plain words are to be the 
paramount guides utilized by the courts in construing the statute 
  see, e.g., United States v. Alvarez-Sanchez, 114 S. Ct. 1599, 
1603 (1994) ("When interpreting a statute, we look first and 
foremost to its text."); Estate of Cowart v. Nicklos Drilling 
Co., 505 U.S. 469, 475 (1992) ("In a statutory construction case, 
the beginning point must be the language of the statute, and when 
a statute speaks with clarity to an issue judicial inquiry into 
the statute's meaning, in all but the most extraordinary 
circumstance, is finished.")   it would seem to follow that both 
the ADA and the Rehabilitation Act apply to state and local 
correctional facilities. 
          Relying on the statute's plain language, the Ninth 
Circuit has held that the Rehabilitation Act protects state 
prison inmates from disability-based discrimination in the 
administration of programs for inmates of correctional 
facilities.  In Bonner v. Lewis, 857 F.2d 559 (9th Cir. 1988), a 
deaf inmate sued prison officials, asserting that the prison was 
obligated under the Rehabilitation Act to provide a qualified 
sign language interpreter in various prison settings, including 
counseling sessions and prison administrative hearings.  Prison 
officials argued that the Rehabilitation Act did not protect 
inmates from disability discrimination because "inmates are 
hardly in need of help to live independently within their 
prisons."  Id. at 562.  The Ninth Circuit disagreed: 
          First, . . . the plain language of the 
          Justice Department's implementing 
          regulations, 28 C.F.R. § 42.503, and the Act 
          itself, which states that it applies to "anyprogram or activity 
receiving Federal 
          financial assistance," 29 U.S.C. § 794 
          (emphasis added) belies [prison officials'] 
          argument.  Second, the Act's goals of 
          independent living and vocational 
          rehabilitation should in fact mirror the 
          goals of prison officials as they attempt to 
          rehabilitate prisoners and prepare them to 
          lead productive lives once their sentences 
          are complete.  By ensuring that inmates have 
          meaningful access to prison activities, such 
          as disciplinary proceedings and counseling, 
          the goals of both the institution and the 
          Rehabilitation Act are served. 
 
Id. 
          Notwithstanding the unambiguous language of the 
disability statutes, the Tenth Circuit has held that the 
Rehabilitation Act and the ADA do not apply to at least certain 
claims arising in the correctional context.  The Tenth Circuit's 
starting point was Williams v. Meese, 926 F.2d 994, 997 (10th 
Cir. 1991).  The court there held that the Rehabilitation Act 
does not apply to employment discrimination claims challenging 
certain aspects of programs involving the employment of federal 
prison inmates.  The court stated, "The section of the 
Rehabilitation Act cited by the plaintiff [section 504], does not 
give plaintiff any substantive rights since the Federal Bureau of 
Prisons does not fit the definition of 'programs or activities' 
governed by that section."  In White v. Colorado, 82 F.3d 364, 
(10th Cir. 1996), the holding in Williams was extended to an 
employment discrimination claim brought by a state prisoner 
pursuant to the ADA: "For the same reasoning relied upon in 
Williams, we hold that the ADA does not apply to prison 
employment situations either."  Id. at 367.   
          Two other circuit courts have voiced an opinion on the 
applicability of the ADA to prisons, albeit without expressly 
ruling on the question.  In Bryant v. Madigan, 84 F.3d 246, 249 
(7th Cir. 1996), the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit 
held that the ADA did not provide a cause of action to a disabled 
state prisoner to challenge the prison's failure to provide 
guardrails to his bed.  The court concluded that no 
discrimination occurred because the inmate did not allege that he 
had been excluded from any prison "service," "program," or 
"activity."  In so holding, the court expressed some doubt as to 
the applicability of the ADA to correctional facilities: "Could 
Congress really have intended disabled prisoners to be 
mainstreamed into an already highly restricted prison society?"  
Without pointing to any evidence of congressional intent which 
might indicate one way or another the answer to this question, 
the court opined that "[j]udge-made exceptions . . .  to laws of 
general applicability are justified to avoid absurdity."  Id. at 
248-49. 
          In Torcasio v. Murray, 57 F.3d 1340 (4th Cir. 1995), 
cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 772 (1996), the Court of Appeals for the 
Fourth Circuit strongly intimated that the Rehabilitation Act and 
the ADA do not apply to state prisons.  The actual holding in 
Torcasio was that, at the time of the alleged discrimination, it 
was not clearly established that the ADA and the Rehabilitation 
Act apply to state prisons, and, consequently, the defendant 
prison officials were entitled to qualified immunity under these 
statutes.  The Torcasio court's primary reason for doubting 
that the statutes cover prisons was that the statutes, although 
seeming to speak in comprehensive terms   "all the operations of 
a department, agency, special purpose district, or other 
instrumentality of a State or of a local government," 29 U.S.C. § 
794(b)(1)(A) (Rehabilitation Act); "any department, agency, 
special purpose district, or other instrumentality of a State . . 
. or local government," 42 U.S.C. § 12131(1) (ADA)   do not 
expressly recite that prisons are among the "all" or "any" 
entities covered.  The Fourth Circuit stated: "Because the 
management of state prisons implicates 'decision[s] of the most 
fundamental sort for a sovereign entity,' Congress must speak 
unequivocally before we will conclude that it has 'clearly' 
subjected state prisons to its enactments."  57 F.3d at 1346 
(citation omitted).  In support of its view that the statutory 
provisions do not speak sufficiently "clearly," the court quoted 
from Will v. Michigan Dept. of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 65 
(1989), in which the Supreme Court, quoting an earlier 
pronouncement in Atascadero State Hospital v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 
234, 242 (1985), observed that "if Congress intends to alter the 
'usual constitutional balance between the States and the Federal 
Government,' it must make its intention to do so 'unmistakably 
clear in the language of the statute.'" 
          We of course acknowledge that the management of prisons 
is a governmental responsibility of great importance.  But so too 
are the management of police and firefighting forces, the 
management of child protection services, and the management of 
the court system   state functions routinely understood to be 
covered by the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA notwithstanding 
that these functions are not expressly referred to in either of 
the statutes.  See Thomlison v. City of Omaha, 63 F.3d 786 (8th 
Cir. 1995) (affirming the denial of summary judgment in a 
Rehabilitation Act claim brought by a firefighter); Doe v. 
Judicial Nominating Commission, 906 F. Supp. 1534 (S.D. Fla. 
1995) (holding that the process for judicial nominations must 
comply with the ADA); Clark v. Virginia Board of Bar Examiners, 
880 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Va. 1995) (holding that requiring state 
bar applicants to answer questions regarding psychotherapy 
violates the ADA); Eric L. v. Bird, 848 F. Supp. 303 (D.N.H. 
1994) (holding that the plaintiffs had stated an ADA claim in 
alleging that the state provided foster care services that 
discriminated on the basis of disability); Ethridge v. Alabama, 
847 F. Supp. 903 (M.D. Ala. 1993) (denying summary judgment in an 
ADA case brought by a disabled police officer); Galloway v. 
Superior Court of the District of Columbia, 816 F. Supp. 12 
(D.D.C. 1993) (holding that the categorical exclusion of blind 
people from juries violates the ADA). 
          More to the point, we are not persuaded that the so- 
called "clear-statement" cases, of which Will is a recent 
example, have been intended by the Supreme Court to provide a 
canon of statutory interpretation which can be of help in 
interpreting statutes whose over-all design indisputably 
contemplates both that the policies and practices of state (as 
well as local) governments are required to conform to norms 
established by Congress and that the remedies include the 
bringing of a lawsuit in the federal courts.  On the contrary, 
the Court has made it plain that the clear-statement requirement 
is to be resorted to in those instances in which the text of a 
federal statute furnishes little real guidance as to whether 
Congress intended to subject state agencies to potential 
liability.  For instance, in EEOC v. Wyoming, 460 U.S. 226, 243 
n.18 (1983), in which the Court examined amendments to the Age 
Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), the Court stated that 
the clear-statement rule was "a tool with which to divine the 
meaning of otherwise ambiguous statutory intent."  The Court 
found, however, that the rule offered no guidance on the question 
raised by the case because "there is no doubt what the intent of 
Congress was: to extend the application of the ADEA to the 
States."  Id.  In Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452 (1991), the 
Court examined whether a statutory exemption to the ADEA for 
"appointee[s] on the policymaking level" included state-court 
judges.  Finding the language of the exemption ambiguous, the 
Court applied the clear-statement rule and held that, because 
Congress had not specifically excluded state-court judges from 
the exemption, state-court judges would be considered to be 
included in the exempted category.  As it had stated in EEOC v. 
Wyoming, the Court in Gregory v. Ashcroft described the clear- 
statement rule as "a rule of statutory construction to be applied 
where statutory intent is ambiguous."  Id. at 470. 
          We think that Will aptly illustrates the scope and 
limits of the "clear-statement" rule.  In that case, which arose 
in a Michigan state court, Ray Will, a state employee, sued 
Michigan's Department of State Police and Director of State 
Police.  The gravamen of Will's suit was that the defendants had 
denied the plaintiff a promotion because of his brother's radical 
political views, a denial alleged to contravene plaintiff's 
federal and state constitutional rights.  In seeking vindication 
of his federal constitutional claims, Will relied on 42 U.S.C. § 
1983, the statute which underpins so much federal civil rights 
litigation, including the case at bar.  Section 1983, which 
derives from the Civil Rights Act of 1871, provides that "[e]very 
person, who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage, of any State . . . subjects . . . any citizen 
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction 
thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or 
immunities secured by the Constitution . . . shall be liable to 
the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other 
proper proceeding for redress."  The Michigan Supreme Court 
concluded that Will's federal claims were not cognizable for the 
reason that neither a state nor a state official acting in an 
official capacity is a "person" within the meaning of section 
1983.  The United States Supreme Court affirmed.  Prior to Will, 
which was decided in 1989, the Court had held, in 1978, in Monell 
v. New York City Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 
(1978), that a municipality is a suable "person" within the 
meaning of section 1983.  But in Will the Court declined to read 
"person" so broadly as to include the several states.  The Court 
noted that the construction of section 1983 contended for by Will 
would, in effect, rewrite the statute in the form "every person, 
including a State, who under color of any statute . . . 
subjects," and that this "would be a decidedly awkward way of 
expressing an intent to subject the States to liability."  491 
U.S. at 64.  Cutting strongly against this "awkward" construction 
that would have made a state suable under section 1983 both in 
federal courts and in the state's own courts was the fact that in 
1979, just a year after Monell, the Court had ruled, in Quern v. 
Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979), that, by virtue of the Eleventh 
Amendment's grant to the states of immunity from suit in the 
federal courts, a federal district court was without jurisdiction 
to entertain a section 1983 suit seeking to recover money damages 
from a state.  While recognizing that Congress has the authority, 
in the exercise of certain of its constitutional powers, to enact 
legislation overcoming the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity, 
the Court in Quern found that "§ 1983 does not explicitly and by 
clear language indicate on its face an intent to sweep away the 
immunity of the States; nor does it have a history which focuses 
directly on the question of state liability and which shows that 
Congress considered and firmly decided to abrogate the Eleventh 
Amendment immunity of the States."  440 U.S. at 345.  In Will, 
the Court built upon Quern v. Jordan.  Having held in Quern v. 
Jordan that Congress, in 1871, in enacting section 1983, "had not 
explicitly and by clear language" evidenced an intent to override 
the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity, the Court in Will held 
that, in utilizing the all-purpose but hardly self-defining word 
"person" in section 1983, Congress had not evidenced an intent to 
take the major step of bringing state governments as well as 
local governments within what was in 1871 an unprecedented 
federal supervisory regime. 
          In marked contrast with section 1983, the 
Rehabilitation Act and the ADA both speak expressly of state 
governments and "any" or "all" of the operations thereof.  Also, 
in marked contrast with section 1983, both the Rehabilitation Act 
and the ADA expressly abrogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity of 
the states.  Against that background, we do not see it as our 
function to require Congress to specify each of the important 
components of state governments that comprise Congress' use of 
the words "any" and "all." 
          The Fourth Circuit, in Torcasio, supplemented its 
clear-statement analysis by finding that some of the statutory 
language did not lead comfortably to prison-based claims.  
Specifically, the court pointed to 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2), in which 
the ADA defines a "qualified individual with a disability" as a 
person who "meets the essential eligibility requirements for the 
receipt of services or the participation in programs or 
activities."  According to the Fourth Circuit, correctional 
facilities do not provide "services," "programs," or 
"activities," as those terms are ordinarily understood.  
Furthermore, the court concluded that "[t]he terms 'eligible' and 
'participate' imply voluntariness on the part of an applicant who 
seeks a benefit from the state; they do not bring to mind 
prisoners who are being held against their will."  57 F.3d at 
1347.  In the context of the case at bar, arguments of this sort 
do not seem compelling.  Here, it is agreed that the jail is to 
make certain forms of treatment available to mentally ill 
inmates.  It is appropriate to characterize such treatment as a 
"service," in that it confers a benefit on the inmates.  And the 
different forms of treatment may be properly described as 
"programs" in that they are an organized series of events for the 
provision of the services.  Indeed, the treatment regimen at 
issue is in fact called the "Forensic Support Program."  In order 
to be deemed "qualified" to receive the services offered through 
this program, one must fall within one or another restricted 
category of the inmate population   i.e., one must be shown to be 
"eligible" within certain specified criteria of eligibility: one 
must be mentally ill, not pose an apparent threat to oneself or 
others, and, of central importance to this appeal, must be 
charged with no more than a minor, non-violent crime and not have 
a history of violence.  Inmates who meet these criteria 
"participate" in mental health services by undergoing the 
treatment protocol chosen by jail officials.  The fact that the 
participation of the inmates may not be voluntary does not alter 
the conclusion that they do participate.   
 
                                B. 
 
          Having held that the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA 
apply to correctional facilities, we must now determine how they 
apply. 
          The Rehabilitation Act and the ADA prohibit public 
entities from discriminating on the basis of disability against 
qualified individuals with disabilities.  As previously noted, 
see supra note 7, section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act provides: 
          No otherwise qualified individual with a 
          disability . . . shall, solely by reason of 
          her or his disability, be excluded from the 
          participation in, be denied the benefits of, 
          or be subjected to discrimination under any 
          program or activity receiving Federal 
          financial assistance . . . . 
 
29 U.S.C. § 794(a).  Moreover, as also previously noted, Title II 
of the ADA extends the Rehabilitation Act's coverage to all 
public entities, whether or not they receive federal funds: 
          [N]o qualified individual with a disability 
          shall, by reason of such disability, be 
          excluded from participation in or be denied 
          the benefits of the services, programs, or 
          activities of a public entity, or be 
          subjected to discrimination by any such 
          entity. 
 
42 U.S.C. § 12132.   
          Although the language of the two statutes differs 
slightly   e.g., the Rehabilitation Act protects against 
discrimination "solely by reason of . . . disability," whereas 
the ADA protects against discrimination "by reason of . . . 
disability"   the standards under the two statutes are identical.  
McDonald v. Pennsylvania Department of Public Welfare, 62 F.3d 
92, 94 (3d Cir. 1995) ("Whether suit is filed under the 
Rehabilitation Act or under the Disabilities Act, the substantive 
standards for determining liability are the same.").  We have 
held that there are four elements for establishing a violation of 
section 504: (1) that the plaintiff is an "individual with a 
disability" as defined under the Act, (2) that the plaintiff is 
"otherwise qualified" for the program sought or that the 
plaintiff would be qualified if the defendant made reasonable 
modifications to the program, (3) that the plaintiff was excluded 
from the program "solely by reason of her or his disability," and 
(4) that the program receives federal funds.  Wagner v. Fair 
Acres Geriatric Center, 49 F.3d 1002, 1009 (3d Cir. 1995).  With 
the exception of the fourth element, which is not pertinent to a 
claim brought under the ADA, the elements of a claim under Title 
II of the ADA are interchangeable with the elements of a claim 
under section 504.  Thus, an ADA Title II claimant must show (1) 
that the plaintiff is "qualified" or that the plaintiff would be 
qualified if the defendant made reasonable modifications, (2) 
that the plaintiff has a "disability," and (3) that "by reason of 
such disability," the plaintiff was excluded from a service, 
program, or activity provided by a public entity.   
          In applying the disability statutes to prisons, courts 
must give considerable weight to the unique needs of prison 
administration and should, when appropriate, defer to the 
judgments of prison officials.  As the Supreme Court stated in 
Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78 (1987), "[J]udgments regarding 
prison security 'are peculiarly within the province and 
professional expertise of corrections officials, and, in the 
absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that 
the officials have exaggerated their response to these 
considerations, courts should ordinarily defer to their expert 
judgment in such matters.'"  Id. at 86 (quoting Pell v. 
Procunier, 417 U.S. 817, 827 (1974)).  Thus, in determining 
whether a plaintiff is qualified for a particular program or 
service provided by the prison, a court should weigh the 
plaintiff's qualifications in light of the needs for prison 
security and other legitimate interests of the prison.  
Similarly, a court determining the reasonableness of a proposed 
modification to a program or service provided by a prison should 
take into account the prison's needs and should ordinarily defer 
to the views of prison officials.   
          The issues to which we now turn are (1) whether 
discrimination against mentally ill inmates because they are 
charged with violent crimes, or because they have a history of 
violence, constitutes discrimination "by reason of" disability; 
and (2) whether inmates who are charged with violent crimes or 
who have a history of violence are "qualified" for community- 
based services. 
 
                                C. 
          The challenged provision of the May 26, 1995 order is, 
on its face, neutral with regard to disability.  Under this 
provision, inmates are excluded from community-based services 
because they are charged with violent crimes or because they have 
a history of violence; this provision does not by its terms 
exclude inmates due to disability.  Accordingly, the County 
argues that such exclusion is not "by reason of" disability: 
"[I]nmates are not excluded because they have mental [illnesses], 
but because they are prisoners who have committed violent 
crimes."  Appellees' Brief at 27.  In the County's view, 
exclusion on the basis of violence cannot amount to disability- 
based discrimination because such exclusion is facially neutral 
with regard to disability and does not evince discriminatory 
animus.  We conclude, however, that a facially neutral rule may 
amount to exclusion "by reason of" disability if such a rule 
causes a cognizable discriminatory impact.  
          In NAACP v. Medical Center, Inc., 657 F.2d 1322, 1328 
(3d Cir. 1981), we held that proof of discriminatory intent was 
not required in a Rehabilitation Act case.  Instead, "proof of 
disparate impact or effects is sufficient."  In Alexander v. 
Choate, 469 U.S. 287 (1985), the Supreme Court, "assume[d] 
without deciding that § 504 reaches at least some conduct that 
has an unjustifiable disparate impact," id. at 299, and held that 
a Rehabilitation Act plaintiff need not show discriminatory 
intent: "Discrimination against the handicapped was perceived by 
Congress to be most often the product, not of invidious animus, 
but rather of thoughtlessness and indifference   of benign 
neglect."  Id. at 295.  The Court reviewed statements by members 
of Congress that the Act sought to eliminate, inter alia, 
"architectural barriers," "discrimination in access to public 
transportation," "the discriminatory effect of job qualification 
. . . procedures," and "[d]iscrimination because [disabled 
individuals] do not have the simplest forms of special 
educational and rehabilitation services."  Id. at 297.  "These 
statements," the Court concluded, "would ring hollow if the 
resulting legislation could not rectify the harms resulting from 
action that discriminated by effect as well as by design."  Id.at 297.   
          In Helen L. v. DiDario, 46 F.3d 325, 335 (3d Cir. 
1995), we held that proof of discrimination under the ADA, as 
under the Rehabilitation Act, does not require a showing of 
discriminatory animus: "Because the ADA evolved from an attempt 
to remedy the effects of 'benign neglect' resulting from the 
'invisibility' of the disabled, Congress could not have intended 
to limit the Act's protections and prohibitions to circumstances 
involving deliberate discrimination."  See also Crowder v. 
Kitagawa, 81 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1996) (holding that the 
ADA is intended "to cover both intentional discrimination and 
discrimination as a result of facially neutral laws").  
Although in Helen L. we did not explicitly state that a disparate 
impact claim may be brought under the ADA, that result was 
implicit in our conclusion that proof of discriminatory intent is 
not required.  In addition, Department of Justice regulations 
implementing the ADA support the conclusion that the 
discrimination prohibited by Title II includes seemingly neutral 
governmental policies which nonetheless have a discriminatory 
effect on individuals with disabilities.  Thus, one regulation 
provides: 
          A public entity shall not impose or apply 
          eligibility criteria that screen out or tend 
          to screen out an individual with a disability 
          or any class of individuals with disabilities 
          from fully and equally enjoying any service, 
          program, or activity, unless such criteria 
          can be shown to be necessary for the 
          provision of the service, program, or 
          activity being offered. 
 
28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(8) (1995).  The explanatory comments show 
that, under this regulation, neutral rules may be actionable if 
they tend to exclude disabled persons because of some 
characteristic symptomatic of their disability:  
          [R]equiring presentation of a driver's 
          license as the sole means of identification 
          for purposes of paying by check would violate 
          this section in situations where, for 
          example, individuals with severe vision 
          impairments or developmental disabilities or 
          epilepsy are ineligible to receive a driver's 
          license and the use of an alternative means 
          of identification, such as another photo I.D. 
          or credit card, is feasible.   
 
28 C.F.R. Pt. 35, App. A at 461 (1995).  In this example, 
individuals with vision impairment are excluded from purchasing 
by check because of an incidental implication of their 
disability.  See also id. at 460 (stating that the regulations 
"prohibit[] both blatantly exclusionary policies or practices and 
nonessential policies and practices that are neutral on their 
face, but deny individuals with disabilities an effective 
opportunity to participate").   
          Although we have not previously had occasion to discuss 
the proof structure of a disparate impact case brought under the 
disability statutes, the elements of disparate impact cases 
brought under Title VII are instructive.  Under Title VII, the 
first element of a disparate impact claim is a showing that a 
facially neutral policy has a disproportionate impact on a 
protected group.  See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k); Albemarle Paper Co. 
v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405 (1975); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 
424 (1971).  Under the Rehabilitation Act or the ADA, the 
equivalent showing is that the challenged policy has a disparate 
impact on individuals with disabilities.  To make such a 
showing is to establish discrimination "by reason of" disability.  
On the record before us, we cannot determine whether the 
challenged portion of the district court's order has a disparate 
impact on individuals with disabilities.   
          In order to determine whether the challenged portion of 
the May 26, 1995 order has discriminatory effects, we must know 
whether the violence assertedly committed by members of the 
appellant class was caused by their disabilities.  The district 
court made no factual findings addressing this question.  
Appellants rely upon a psychologist's affidavit, which states, 
"It is very common for mental illness to manifest itself through 
minor forms of physical or what may be viewed as aggressive 
expression.  The acutely mentally ill are often unable to resolve 
problems they face verbally or with the aid of friends or family 
members."  App. at 68A (Aff. of Lillian L. Meyers, Ph.D).  While 
this affidavit may offer some help, it is extremely vague   for 
instance, it is unclear what types of mental illnesses are being 
discussed or what forms of violent behavior are being attributed 
to such illnesses.  Given the absence of factual findings by the 
district court and with only this affidavit before us, we are not 
in a position to say how, or if, violence that may have been 
committed by members of the appellant class is symptomatic of 
their mental illnesses.  As a result, we have no basis for 
deciding whether exclusion of these class members on the basis of 
violence is exclusion "by reason of" disability.   
 
                                D. 
          Assuming that the challenged criterion causes a 
disparate impact on members of the appellant class which can be 
attributed to their disabilities   and that such exclusion 
therefore constitutes discrimination "by reason of" disability   
the district court's order of May 26, 1995 will nonetheless 
survive an ADA and Rehabilitation Act challenge if the excluded 
class members fail to show that they are qualified for community- 
based mental health services.  We must therefore examine this 
element of the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA. 
          The ADA defines the term "qualified individual with a 
disability" as 
          an individual with a disability who, with or 
          without reasonable modifications to rules, 
          policies, or practices, the removal of 
          architectural, communication, or 
          transportation barriers, or the provision of 
          auxiliary aids and services, meets the 
          essential eligibility requirements for the 
          receipt of services or the participation in 
          programs or activities provided by a public 
          entity. 
 
42 U.S.C. § 12131(2).  Under this definition, an individual is 
"qualified" for the receipt of governmental services if the 
individual satisfies the "essential eligibility requirements" for 
receiving the services.  A "qualified" individual need not 
satisfy all the eligibility requirements if "reasonable 
modifications" can be made to allow the individual to 
participate.  See Wagner v. Fair Acres Geriatric Center, 49 F.3d 
1002, 1009 (3d Cir. 1995) ("[A]n individual may be otherwise 
qualified in some instances even though he cannot meet all of a 
program's requirements."). In order to determine whether an ADA 
plaintiff is "qualified," a court must (1) ascertain the 
eligibility criteria for the challenged activity, (2) determine 
which criteria are "essential," and (3) determine whether the 
plaintiff either satisfies the essential criteria or could 
satisfy these criteria if reasonable modifications were made.  As 
discussed above, we think that as a general rule courts should 
defer to the judgments of prison officials as to what 
qualifications are essential and what modifications would be 
reasonable. 
          In this case, the eligibility criteria for community- 
based mental health services include: "Persons must be charged 
with a minor, non-violent crime and not have a past history of 
violence."  Order of May 26, 1995 at ¶ 5.  In this appeal, 
appellants argue that this is not an "essential" criterion for 
community-based services.  Appellants further argue that the 
public safety concerns furthered by the challenged criterion can 
be addressed through individualized assessments of otherwise 
eligible inmates.  Providing such assessments, appellants 
contend, would be a reasonable modification. 
          The ADA regulations provide some guidance on which 
eligibility requirements are "essential" and which are subject to 
"reasonable modifications": 
          (7)  A public entity shall make reasonable 
          modifications in policies, practices, or 
          procedures when the modifications are 
          necessary to avoid discrimination on the 
          basis of disability, unless the public entity 
          can demonstrate that making the modifications 
          would fundamentally alter the nature of the 
          service, program, or activity. 
 
          (8)  A public entity shall not impose or 
          apply eligibility criteria that screen out or 
          tend to screen out an individual with a 
          disability or any class of individuals with 
          disabilities from fully and equally enjoying 
          any service, program, or activity, unless 
          such criteria can be shown to be necessary 
          for the provision of the service, program, or 
          activity being offered. 
 
28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b) (1995).  Under these provisions, the 
"essential eligibility requirements" of a public entity's program 
are those which are "necessary for the provision" of the program 
and which cannot be modified without "fundamentally alter[ing]" 
the nature of the program.  See Easley v. Snider, 36 F.3d 297, 
302 (3d Cir. 1994) (stating, in a section 504 case, "[I]f there 
is no factual basis in the record demonstrating that 
accommodating the individual would require a fundamental 
modification or an undue burden, then the handicapped person isotherwise 
qualified and refusal to waive the requirement is 
discriminatory.") (emphasis in original); Pottgen v. Missouri 
State High School Activities Ass'n, 40 F.3d 926, 932-33 (8th Cir. 
1994) (R. Arnold, J., dissenting) (stating, in an ADA case, "But 
if a rule can be modified without doing violence to its essential 
purposes . . ., I do not believe that it can be 'essential' to 
the nature of the program or activity to refuse to modify the 
rule."). 
          The County argues that allowing violent inmates to 
participate in the community-based programs would destroy the 
viability of such programs: 
          The County will not release violent offenders 
          into the community, nor will the community or 
          the providers accept them.  Additionally, it 
          is hard to imagine that a judge will approve 
          their release.  If given a choice to either 
          open these programs to all prisoners 
          including violent offenders or shut them 
          down, then the County will be compelled to 
          shut them down.  The County will not risk a 
          tragedy in the community which would 
          jeopardize the existence of the other 
          community-based programs.  Sustaining the 
          Inmates' argument and thus, accommodating the 
          mental health inmates who are charged with a 
          violent crime, convicted of a violent crime, 
          or possess a past history of violence, with 
          an individualized assessment, would be 
          unreasonable because it would necessitate a 
          modification of an essential nature of the 
          program, as well as, place undue burdens on 
          the County. 
 
Appellees' Brief at 20-21.  Although this passage does not 
precisely articulate what the County considers to be the 
fundamental purposes of the community-based programs or how these 
purposes would be jeopardized by providing individualized 
assessments of inmates charged with violent crimes or who have 
histories of violence, the statement can be construed as 
expressing the County's belief that allowing inmates charged with 
violent crimes or who have a history of violence to participate 
in community-based programs would threaten public safety; the 
County further argues that this threat to safety would undermine 
public confidence in community-based programs.  The County thus 
appears to assert that an "essential eligibility requirement" for 
the community-based programs is that an inmate not threaten 
public safety.  We recognize that ensuring public safety is, 
indeed, essential if the prison is to provide community-based 
services to mentally ill inmates.  The only question is whether 
the goal of protecting public safety can be accomplished without 
excluding all mentally ill inmates charged with violent crimes or 
who have a history of violence. 
          In School Board of Nassau County v. Arline, 480 U.S. 
273 (1987), a case arising under the Rehabilitation Act, the 
Court recognized that, in some circumstances, the interests of 
persons with disabilities must be balanced against public health 
and safety concerns.  The ADA implements Arline's conclusion 
that covered entities must balance the needs of public health and 
safety against the interests of individuals with disabilities.  
Title II regulations explicitly adopt the standard articulated in 
Arline for determining whether providing services to a person 
with a disability poses an unacceptable risk: 
               The determination that a person poses a 
          direct threat to the health or safety of 
          others may not be based on generalizations or 
          stereotypes about the effects of a particular 
          disability.  It must be based on an 
          individualized assessment, based on 
          reasonable judgment that relies on current 
          medical evidence or on the best available 
          objective evidence, to determine: the nature, 
          duration, and severity of the risk; the 
          probability that the potential injury will 
          actually occur; and whether reasonable 
          modifications of policies, practices, or 
          procedures will mitigate the risk.  This is 
          the test established by the Supreme Court in 
          Arline.  Such an inquiry is essential if the 
          law is to achieve its goal of protecting 
          disabled individuals from discrimination 
          based on prejudice, stereotypes, or unfounded 
          fear, while giving appropriate weight to 
          legitimate concerns, such as the need to 
          avoid exposing others to significant health 
          and safety risks. 
 
28 C.F.R. Pt. 35, App. A at 455-56 (1995).   
          The record on appeal does not contain any factual basis 
for determining whether, in light of the applicable standards, 
the threat to public safety posed by inmates charged with, or who 
have a history of, violence, makes them categorically unqualified 
for community-based services.  There have been no factual 
findings regarding the risks that such inmates would pose if they 
were allowed to participate in community-based services.  We do 
not know what types of mental illness the inmates are afflicted 
with, the nature of their past violence, and their propensity for 
violent behavior in the future.  Additionally, the record does 
not reveal the details of the services provided under the rubric 
of community-based programs or the safety protections in place 
for these programs.  Thus, as we noted above, see supra note 2, 
we do not know the extent of the interaction, if any, between 
members of the public and those inmates who participate; we 
similarly do not know what security measures are in place during 
any such interactions.   
          We further lack any factual basis for determining 
whether the modification appellants seek is reasonable.  Rather 
than a blanket exclusion of all inmates who are charged with, or 
who have a history of, violence, appellants seek individualized 
assessments of the risks posed by each inmate who might otherwise 
be qualified for community-based programs.  Under such a regime, 
inmates assessed as dangerous would be excluded, while those 
assessed as safe would be eligible.  While Arline and the ADA 
regulations recognize a preference for individualized assessments 
of the qualifications of persons with disabilities, rather than 
excluding entire categories of disabled persons, the ADA does not 
require individualized assessments in every case.  The comments 
to the regulations state:  
               A public entity may, however, impose 
          neutral rules and criteria that screen out, 
          or tend to screen out, individuals with 
          disabilities if the criteria are necessary 
          for the safe operation of the program in 
          question.  Examples of safety qualifications 
          that would be justifiable in appropriate 
          circumstances would include eligibility 
          requirements for drivers' license, or a 
          requirement that all participants in a 
          recreational rafting expedition be able to 
          meet a necessary level of swimming 
          proficiency.  Safety requirements must be 
          based on actual risks and not on speculation, 
          stereotypes, or generalizations about 
          individuals with disabilities. 
 
28 C.F.R. Pt. 35, App. A at 461 (1995).  Requiring individualized 
assessments in every case might impose an undue hardship on a 
covered entity.  See Arline, 480 U.S. at 287 n.17 ("Accommodation 
is not reasonable if it . . . imposes 'undue financial and 
administrative burdens'" on a covered entity) (quoting 
Southeastern Community College v. Davis, 442 U.S. 397, 412 
(1979)); Wagner v. Fair Acres Geriatric Center, 49 F.3d 1002, 
1009 (3d Cir. 1995) ("[R]equiring accommodation is unreasonable 
if it would place undue burdens, such as extensive costs, on the 
recipient of federal funds.").  In order to determine whether 
requiring individualized assessments would constitute a 
reasonable modification, a court must weigh the effectiveness of 
the assessments against the costs they would impose.  Here, the 
record contains no findings on how effective individual 
assessments would be in screening out inmates who pose a threat 
to public safety.  Nor are there findings on the burdens the 
County would incur if it were required to make such assessments.  
          Thus, on the record before us, we cannot determine 
whether inmates excluded from community-based mental health 
services on the basis of past violent behavior or on the basis of 
pending charges of violent conduct are otherwise qualified for 
these services or whether they could be qualified with reasonable 
modifications to the services.  As a result, there is a factual 
dispute regarding whether the modification approved by the 
district court complies with the ADA.  Accordingly, we hold that 
the district court abused its discretion in approving the 
modification of the consent decree without first holding a 
hearing and issuing factual findings.  See Delaware Valley 
Citizens' Council v. Pennsylvania, 674 F.2d 976, 981 (3d Cir. 
1982).  We will therefore vacate the order modifying the consent 
decree and remand to the district court.  On remand, the 
plaintiffs will bear the burden of establishing that they are 
qualified for the programs at issue and that the proposed 
screening devices constitute reasonable accommodations to their 
disabilities.  Given the degree of deference to which prison 
officials' policies are entitled, the plaintiffs' burden is not a 
light one.  We believe that a remand is necessary, however, so 
that the parties may present evidence, and the district court may 
assess this evidence, in light of the applicable standards which, 
in this opinion, we have undertaken to clarify. 
 
                            Conclusion 
          We conclude that, contrary to appellees' contention, 
correctional facilities are within the scope of the 
Rehabilitation Act and the ADA.  However, the record developed in 
the district court and presented on this appeal does not provide 
enough information to enable us to determine whether, as 
appellants contend, the exclusion of certain members of the 
appellant class from participation in the community-based mental 
health programs contravenes the Rehabilitation Act and the ADA.  
Accordingly, we vacate the order appealed from and remand the 
case for further consideration by the district court.  On an 
amplified evidentiary record, the district court will be in a 
position to prepare factual findings and conclusions of law 
directed to the following issues: (1) whether the exclusion from 
community-based mental health services of mentally ill inmates 
who are charged with violent crimes or who have past histories of 
violence constitutes discrimination by reason of disability; and 
(2) whether, with or without reasonable modifications of the 
services, such inmates are otherwise qualified to participate in 
community-based mental health services. 
 
INMATES OF THE ALLEGHENY COUNTY JAIL, et al. v. CYRIL H. WECHT, 
et al., No. 95-3402 
BECKER, Circuit Judge, concurring and dissenting. 
          Judge Pollak has explained convincingly why the 
Rehabilitation Act (RA) and the Americans with Disabilities Act 
(ADA) apply to the community-based forensic support program at 
issue in the case.  I, therefore, join in Part II.A of the 
majority opinion.  For the reasons set forth below, I cannot 
agree that the district court abused its discretion in modifying 
the consent decree to exclude violent offenders from the forensic 
program, or that this case should be remanded for a protracted 
set of hearings.  To that extent, I respectfully dissent. 
 
                                I. 
          As the majority aptly notes, a central issue in this 
appeal is whether mentally ill individuals who have been charged 
with or committed a violent offense are "qualified" for the 
forensic program.  As the ADA makes clear, an individual with a 
disability can still be "qualified" (or "otherwise qualified" in 
the vernacular of the RA) if he or she can meet the "essential 
eligibility requirements" of that program with reasonable 
accommodation, which can include both "reasonable modifications 
to rules, policies, or practices" and the "provision of auxiliary 
aids and services."  See 42 U.S.C. § 12131(2).   
          Obviously, mentally ill violent offenders cannot meet 
the eligibility requirements of the forensic program without both 
a modification of the program's existing requirements and an 
accommodation of their particular condition.  Individuals who 
have committed or been charged with violent crimes in the past 
are specifically excluded from program participation, and, even 
if they receive an individualized assessment, many are not likely 
to satisfy the essential requirement of any such program -- that 
they not pose a violent risk in the future -- without treatment.  
Therefore, appellants seek the following accommodation:  they 
propose that mentally ill violent offenders be offered individual 
psychiatric assessments and that those offenders diagnosed with 
"treatable" violent tendencies be allowed to take part in the 
forensic program.   
          We must determine whether this proposed accommodation 
is reasonable.  An accommodation is reasonable if it would not 
"necessitate modification of the essential nature of a program" 
or "place undue burdens such as extensive costs, on the recipient 
of federal funds."  Strathie v. Department of Transp., 716 F.2d 
227, 230 (3d Cir. 1983).   
          I do not believe that Judge Cohill abused his 
discretion when he concluded that Appellants' suggested 
accommodation was unreasonable.  To me, the issue is plain.   
Including violent offenders in a community-release program (like 
the forensic program at issue here) without doubt changes its 
"essential nature."  Community-based programs are accepted by the 
public because they exclude individuals who have committed 
violent offenses.  It is clear that letting individuals charged 
with or convicted of murder, rape, or kidnapping into the 
community -- regardless of whether they can be "treated" -- would 
cause a significant public outcry and lead to the elimination of 
the forensic program.  Furthermore, it is undeniable that the 
enormous cost of requiring individualized psychiatric assessments 
of all potential releasees would place an unacceptable burden on 
the Appellees.  In my view, Judge Cohill did not abuse his 
discretion by considering these realities.  As Appellants are not 
"qualified" for the program, they need not be allowed to 
participate. 
 
                               II. 
          I also cannot agree with the majority's decision to 
send this case back to the district court for more factfinding on 
matters such as the Appellants' "propensity for violent behavior 
in the future."  Majority Opinion at 44.  In my view, this is a 
meaningless exercise.  Notwithstanding the conclusory and 
undocumented affidavit of Lillian Meyers, one the majority 
itself labels "vague," Majority Opinion at 37, it seems evident 
that this tremendous expenditure of judicial resources will 
uncover nothing, for the relevant psychology literature suggests 
that mental health professionals cannot reliably predict 
dangerousness, at least not yet.   
          Although mental health professionals once presumed that 
they were able to predict violent behavior accurately, beginning 
in the 1970s researchers began compiling data demonstrating that 
this assumption was incorrect.  See Randy K. Otto, On the Ability 
of Mental Health Professionals to "Predict Dangerousness":  A 
Commentary on Interpretations of the "Dangerousness" Literature, 
18 LAW & PSYCHOL. REV. 43, 45 (1994) [hereinafter Dangerousness 
Literature].  Indeed, early researchers concluded that mental 
health professionals were "less accurate than the flip of a 
coin," see Bruce J. Ennis & Thomas R. Litwack, Psychiatry and the 
Presumption of Expertise:  Flipping Coins in the Courtroom, 62 
CAL. L. REV. 693, 737 (1974), and should be barred from offering 
testimony.  Id. at 733-738; see also American Psychiatric 
Association, Report of the American Psychiatric Association Task 
force on Clinical Aspects of the Violent Individual 20 (1974) 
(concluding that "[n]either psychiatrists nor anyone else have 
demonstrated an ability to predict future violence or 
dangerousness.").  Charles Ewing, a psychologist and attorney, 
went so far as to conclude that psychiatrists or psychologists 
who attempt to predict dangerousness violate their ethical 
obligations "to render judgments that rested on a scientific 
basis."  Charles P. Ewing, "Dr. Death" and the Case for an 
Ethical Ban on Psychiatric and Psychological Predictions of 
Dangerousness in Capital Sentencing Proceedings, 8 AM. J.L. & 
MED. 407, 418 (1983).  
          Professor Randy Otto -- a leading researcher -- 
concludes that although the pessimism of these "first generation" 
researchers may have been exaggerated, as of 1994, researchers 
have at best "some" ability to predict dangerousness.  
Dangerousness Literature, supra at 62-63.  "Some" ability to 
predict dangerousness, of course, is patently insufficient when 
the safety of the public is at stake.  And neither the literature 
nor the papers in this case reveal any discovery in the last two 
years that there is any reliable way to predict dangerousness 
without reference to prior conduct.   
          It seems to me, therefore, that the venture upon which 
the majority has set the district court has insufficient promise 
to justify interfering with its exercise of discretion.  I also 
believe that the cost of this enterprise would be frightful, 
itself an element of "reasonable accommodation." 
                                III. 
          The majority's improvident decision is aggravated by 
the unusual posture of this case.  Much like the "trouble with 
Harry" in the classic Hitchcock movie, the trouble with the 
forensic program is that it is dead.  The program has expired.  
See Majority Opinion at 47, n.28.  Although, as the majority 
explains, vacatur of the order allows the district court to meet 
its obligations under the 1989 decree, the 1989 decree provided 
for an in-house mental health facility, not a community-based 
program.  Therefore, individualized assessments to determine 
whether violent offenders should be allowed in the community 
release program will be relevant only if a community release 
program is again established.  If the parties do not again agree 
to a community release program -- or if Judge Cohill does not 
approve it -- the majority opinion will be a meaningless 
exercise.  Thus, while the case may be technically justiciable, 
it seems a wiser exercise of judicial discretion to stay our 
hand. 
          I would affirm the order of the district court. 
